Seminar at the Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition (LLC), University of Turin (28 February 2019). ABSTRACT. Much human mental activity is intentional. The mental state of a subject is directed to (intends) an object. This essay is about these two poles of intentionality. The most notable thing about the object pole is that is can be a non-existent object or state of affairs. This is most obvious in acts concerning fiction. To understand such states we therefore need non-existent objects. These objects may not actually have the properties they are thought of as having; but they have them in the scenarios intended: in the case of fictional objects, the fictional scenarios. Turning to the subject pole, the subject itself is a kind of object. Most Western philosophers have taken it to be an existent one; but many Buddhist philosophers have held it to be a non-existent one. The self is simply an illusion produced by a bunch of neural processes. That of which we have an illusion is a non-existent object in a fiction the person tells about themself.
0 Comments